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Abstract—Recently, Wang-Wang have discussed a two birds
with one stone: two-factor authentication with security beyond
conventional bound. We find that this scheme is vulnerable to the
password exposure attack and also does not offer user anonymity,
which is an important feature for some of the applications like
e-healthcare services, e-banking, etc. In this paper, we provide
the solution to these problems.
Index Terms—Two-factor authentication, password exposure
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of internet, most of the resources and services
are available online. However, the security is an important
issue to access online resources and services. A remote user
authentication scheme can help to access online resources and
services securely. Such scheme allows a user and a server
to authenticate each other over an insecure channel. In 1981,
Lamport [1] developed the first remote user authentication
scheme in which the server was required to keep a pass-
word table. Since then, many smart card based remote user
authentication schemes [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] have been
discussed that do not require password tables.
In 2009, Xu et al. discussed a user authentication scheme
based on smart card [9] and claimed that it is secured even if
the smart card is lost. Sood et al. [10] found that the scheme
[9] is not resistant to forgery attack and they improved it
by overcoming its weakness. The paper [11] cryptanalyzed
the scheme [9] and found that it is not resistant to the
impersonation attack if a valid but malicious user uses the
information stored in his own smart card. They improved this
scheme to overcome its limitation. Horng et al. [12] found
that the scheme [11] is not resistant to the insider and offline
password guessing attacks.
In 2014, Chen et al. [13] cryptanalyzed the schemes [10],
[11] and they found that the scheme [10] does not offer mutual
authentication and the scheme [11] is not resistant to the
smart card loss and off-line guessing attacks. They designed an
improved scheme to remove these flaws. Jiang et al. [14] found
that the scheme [13] is not secured against the offline password
guessing attack and designed an improved scheme to overcome
this problem. Mishra et al. [15] discussed the security issues
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of the scheme [14] and showed that it is susceptible to the
insider, user impersonation and password guessing attacks.
They designed a scheme to overcome these security flaws.
Recently, Wang-Wang [16] have discussed a two factor au-
thentication scheme and suggested twelve independent security
criteria that a two-factor authentication scheme should satisfy
as follows: (i) no verifier-table (ii) no password exposure (iii)
no smart card loss attack (iv) password friendly (v) resis-
tance to known attacks (vi) provision of key agreement (vii)
sound repairability (viii) no clock synchronization (ix) mutual
authentication (x) timely typo detection (xi) user anonymity
(xii) forward secrecy. Out these, user anonymity and password
exposure are the essential properties of an user authentication
scheme. User anonymity means user identity-protection and
un-traceability. That is the scheme should protect user identity
and prevent user activities from tracing. Password exposure
means that the privileged administrator cannot get the user’s
password. In this paper, we analyze the security of the scheme
[16] and find that it is susceptible to the password exposure
attack and also lacks user anonymity. We present an improved
scheme to overcome its limitations.
A. Threat model
Here, we present the capabilities of an attacker A as follows:
• A can eavesdrop all the transmitted messages between the
participants over a public channel.
• A can reroute, resend, delete, modify and insert the
eavesdropped messages.
• A can take out all the information saved in the smart card
of a valid user if it is obtained by A somehow [17], [18].
• A cannot know the user’s password as well as steal the
user’s smart card at the same time.
• A can enumerate offline all possible elements in the
cartesian product Did ×Dpw in a reasonable amount of
time [16].
• The privileged administrator may act as an attacker A.
The remaining paper is arranged as follows: section II
reviews the Wang-Wang’s scheme in brief and section III
presents its cryptanalysis. Section IV introduces our proposed
scheme and its performance analysis is presented in section
V. Its formal security analysis is same as that of the Wang-
Wang’s scheme as we do not change the parameters which
are transmitted via a public channel and hence it is omitted.
Finally, section VI concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF WANG-WANG’S SCHEME
Here, we briefly review the robust password authentication
scheme using smart card by Wang-Wang [16] that consists of
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the following four phases. The notations used in this paper are
given in Table I.
TABLE I








x S’s secret key
y S’s public key
p, q Large prime numbers
n0 An integer
Honey List Link list
m0 Number of items in Honey List
Hi(.) One-way hash function





User Ui performs the below steps to register with server S:
1) Ui selects his identity IDi, password PWi, and a
random string b.
2) He sends {IDi, H0(b||PWi)} to S through a private
channel.
3) After obtaining the request from Ui at time T , S
chooses a random number ai and calculates Ai =
H0((H0(IDi)⊕H0(b||PWi)) mod n0). S verifies if Ui
is a registered user. If not, then S stores the information
{IDi, Treg = T, ai, Honey List = NULL} in its
database; otherwise, it replaces the value of Treg with
T , ai with newly selected ai, and Honey List with
NULL in its database corresponding to Ui. S then
calculates Ni = H0(b||PWi)⊕H0(x||IDi||Treg).
4) S stores the information {Ni, Ai, Ai ⊕ ai, q, g, y, n0,
H0(.), ...H3(.)} in a SC and transmits it to Ui securely.
5) After obtaining the smart card, Ui stores b into
it; thus, the smart card contains {Ni, Ai, Ai ⊕
ai, q, g, y, n0, H0(.), ..., H3(.), b}
B. Login phase
The steps are performed as below in this phase:
1) Ui inputs his identity ID∗i and password PW
∗
i after
inserting his SC into the card reader attached with the
system.
2) SC calculates A∗i = H0((H0(ID
∗
i ) ⊕ H0(b||PW ∗i ))
mod n0) and checks if A∗i = Ai. If it is not true, the
session is terminated.
3) SC selects a random number u and calculates C1 =
gu mod p, Y1 = yu mod p, k = H0(x||IDi||Treg) =
Ni⊕H0(b||PW ∗i ), ai = (Ai⊕ai)⊕Ai, CIDi = ID∗i ⊕
H0(C1||Y1), CAKi = (ai||k)⊕H0(C1||Y1), and Mi =
H0(Y1||k||CIDi||CAKi).
4) Ui sends the message {C1, CIDi, CAKi,Mi} to S
through a public channel.
C. Verification phase
On getting the login message {C1, CIDi, CAKi,Mi} from
Ui, S performs the below steps:
1) S calculates Y1 = (C1)x mod p and IDi = CIDi ⊕
H0(C1||Y1). It verifies the format of IDi. If it is not
found in correct format, then the session is terminated.
2) S calculates k = H0(x||IDi||Treg) and M∗i =
H0(Y1||k||CIDi||CAKi), where Treg is excerpted from
its database corresponding to the entry IDi. It checks if
M∗i = Mi. If it is false, the session is terminated.
3) S computes a‘i||k‘ = CAKi ⊕H0(C1||Y1) and verifies
if a‘i is equal to the stored ai. If it is false, S rejects the
request; otherwise, it check if k‘ = k. If it is true, then
perform next step; otherwise, if a‘i = ai and k
‘
i = ki,
then S concludes that the card of Ui is corrupted with a
probability 1− 12n0 . In that case, S either enters k
‘ into
Honey List if |Honey List| < m0 (e.g. m0 = 10) or
suspends the smart card of Ui until he re-registers (i.e.
when |Honey List| = m0).
4) S creates a random number v and calculates the tem-
porary key KS = (C1)v mod p,C2 = gv mod p
and C3 = H1(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KS). S sends the
message {C2, C3} to Ui via a public channel.
5) After getting the message {C2, C3} from S, SC
calculates KU = (C2)u mod p,C∗3 =
H1(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ), and checks if C∗3 = C3.
If it is right, Ui authenticates S and calculates C4 =
H2(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ). Ui sends the message
{C4} to S via an insecure channel.
6) On obtaining the message {C4} from Ui, S calculates
C4
∗ = H2(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KS), and checks if
C∗4 = C4. If it is true, S authenticates Ui and accepts
the login request; otherwise, the session is terminated.
7) Ui and S share the session key skU =
H3(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ) = H3(IDi||IDS ||Y1||
C2||k||KS) = skS for secured future communication.
D. Password change phase
User Ui performs the below steps in this phase:
1) Ui inputs his IDi and PWi after inserting his SC into
the card reader attached with the system.
2) SC calculates A∗i = H0((H0(IDi)⊕H0(b||PWi)) mod
n0) and checks if A∗i = Ai. If it is not true, the request
for changing password is rejected.
3) Smart card prompts Ui to enter a new password
PWnewi and calculates Ni
new = Ni ⊕ H0(b||PWi) ⊕
H0(b||PWnewi ) and Anewi = H0((H0(IDi) ⊕
H0(b||PWnewi )) mod n0). It replaces the values of
Ni, Ai and ai ⊕ Ai with Nnewi , Anewi and ai ⊕ Anewi ,
respectively. Thus the password is changed successfully.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF WANG-WANG’S SCHEME
We cryptanalyze the Wang-Wang’s scheme [16] based on
the threat model as given in section I-A and find the following
security problems:
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to authenticate each other over an insecure channel. In 1981,
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scheme in which the server was required to keep a pass-
word table. Since then, many smart card based remote user
authentication schemes [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] have been
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of the scheme [14] and showed that it is susceptible to the
insider, user impersonation and password guessing attacks.
They designed a scheme to overcome these security flaws.
Recently, Wang-Wang [16] have discussed a two factor au-
thentication scheme and suggested twelve independent security
criteria that a two-factor authentication scheme should satisfy
as follows: (i) no verifier-table (ii) no password exposure (iii)
no smart card loss attack (iv) password friendly (v) resis-
tance to known attacks (vi) provision of key agreement (vii)
sound repairability (viii) no clock synchronization (ix) mutual
authentication (x) timely typo detection (xi) user anonymity
(xii) forward secrecy. Out these, user anonymity and password
exposure are the essential properties of an user authentication
scheme. User anonymity means user identity-protection and
un-traceability. That is the scheme should protect user identity
and prevent user activities from tracing. Password exposure
means that the privileged administrator cannot get the user’s
password. In this paper, we analyze the security of the scheme
[16] and find that it is susceptible to the password exposure
attack and also lacks user anonymity. We present an improved
scheme to overcome its limitations.
A. Threat model
Here, we present the capabilities of an attacker A as follows:
• A can eavesdrop all the transmitted messages between the
participants over a public channel.
• A can reroute, resend, delete, modify and insert the
eavesdropped messages.
• A can take out all the information saved in the smart card
of a valid user if it is obtained by A somehow [17], [18].
• A cannot know the user’s password as well as steal the
user’s smart card at the same time.
• A can enumerate offline all possible elements in the
cartesian product Did ×Dpw in a reasonable amount of
time [16].
• The privileged administrator may act as an attacker A.
The remaining paper is arranged as follows: section II
reviews the Wang-Wang’s scheme in brief and section III
presents its cryptanalysis. Section IV introduces our proposed
scheme and its performance analysis is presented in section
V. Its formal security analysis is same as that of the Wang-
Wang’s scheme as we do not change the parameters which
are transmitted via a public channel and hence it is omitted.
Finally, section VI concludes the paper.
II. REVIEW OF WANG-WANG’S SCHEME
Here, we briefly review the robust password authentication
scheme using smart card by Wang-Wang [16] that consists of
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User Ui performs the below steps to register with server S:
1) Ui selects his identity IDi, password PWi, and a
random string b.
2) He sends {IDi, H0(b||PWi)} to S through a private
channel.
3) After obtaining the request from Ui at time T , S
chooses a random number ai and calculates Ai =
H0((H0(IDi)⊕H0(b||PWi)) mod n0). S verifies if Ui
is a registered user. If not, then S stores the information
{IDi, Treg = T, ai, Honey List = NULL} in its
database; otherwise, it replaces the value of Treg with
T , ai with newly selected ai, and Honey List with
NULL in its database corresponding to Ui. S then
calculates Ni = H0(b||PWi)⊕H0(x||IDi||Treg).
4) S stores the information {Ni, Ai, Ai ⊕ ai, q, g, y, n0,
H0(.), ...H3(.)} in a SC and transmits it to Ui securely.
5) After obtaining the smart card, Ui stores b into
it; thus, the smart card contains {Ni, Ai, Ai ⊕
ai, q, g, y, n0, H0(.), ..., H3(.), b}
B. Login phase
The steps are performed as below in this phase:
1) Ui inputs his identity ID∗i and password PW
∗
i after
inserting his SC into the card reader attached with the
system.
2) SC calculates A∗i = H0((H0(ID
∗
i ) ⊕ H0(b||PW ∗i ))
mod n0) and checks if A∗i = Ai. If it is not true, the
session is terminated.
3) SC selects a random number u and calculates C1 =
gu mod p, Y1 = yu mod p, k = H0(x||IDi||Treg) =
Ni⊕H0(b||PW ∗i ), ai = (Ai⊕ai)⊕Ai, CIDi = ID∗i ⊕
H0(C1||Y1), CAKi = (ai||k)⊕H0(C1||Y1), and Mi =
H0(Y1||k||CIDi||CAKi).
4) Ui sends the message {C1, CIDi, CAKi,Mi} to S
through a public channel.
C. Verification phase
On getting the login message {C1, CIDi, CAKi,Mi} from
Ui, S performs the below steps:
1) S calculates Y1 = (C1)x mod p and IDi = CIDi ⊕
H0(C1||Y1). It verifies the format of IDi. If it is not
found in correct format, then the session is terminated.
2) S calculates k = H0(x||IDi||Treg) and M∗i =
H0(Y1||k||CIDi||CAKi), where Treg is excerpted from
its database corresponding to the entry IDi. It checks if
M∗i = Mi. If it is false, the session is terminated.
3) S computes a‘i||k‘ = CAKi ⊕H0(C1||Y1) and verifies
if a‘i is equal to the stored ai. If it is false, S rejects the
request; otherwise, it check if k‘ = k. If it is true, then
perform next step; otherwise, if a‘i = ai and k
‘
i = ki,
then S concludes that the card of Ui is corrupted with a
probability 1− 12n0 . In that case, S either enters k
‘ into
Honey List if |Honey List| < m0 (e.g. m0 = 10) or
suspends the smart card of Ui until he re-registers (i.e.
when |Honey List| = m0).
4) S creates a random number v and calculates the tem-
porary key KS = (C1)v mod p,C2 = gv mod p
and C3 = H1(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KS). S sends the
message {C2, C3} to Ui via a public channel.
5) After getting the message {C2, C3} from S, SC
calculates KU = (C2)u mod p,C∗3 =
H1(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ), and checks if C∗3 = C3.
If it is right, Ui authenticates S and calculates C4 =
H2(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ). Ui sends the message
{C4} to S via an insecure channel.
6) On obtaining the message {C4} from Ui, S calculates
C4
∗ = H2(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KS), and checks if
C∗4 = C4. If it is true, S authenticates Ui and accepts
the login request; otherwise, the session is terminated.
7) Ui and S share the session key skU =
H3(IDi||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ) = H3(IDi||IDS ||Y1||
C2||k||KS) = skS for secured future communication.
D. Password change phase
User Ui performs the below steps in this phase:
1) Ui inputs his IDi and PWi after inserting his SC into
the card reader attached with the system.
2) SC calculates A∗i = H0((H0(IDi)⊕H0(b||PWi)) mod
n0) and checks if A∗i = Ai. If it is not true, the request
for changing password is rejected.
3) Smart card prompts Ui to enter a new password
PWnewi and calculates Ni
new = Ni ⊕ H0(b||PWi) ⊕
H0(b||PWnewi ) and Anewi = H0((H0(IDi) ⊕
H0(b||PWnewi )) mod n0). It replaces the values of
Ni, Ai and ai ⊕ Ai with Nnewi , Anewi and ai ⊕ Anewi ,
respectively. Thus the password is changed successfully.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF WANG-WANG’S SCHEME
We cryptanalyze the Wang-Wang’s scheme [16] based on
the threat model as given in section I-A and find the following
security problems:
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D. Password change phase
User Ui performs the following steps to change his pass-
word:
1) Ui inputs his IDi and PWi after inserting his SC into
the card reader attached with the system.
2) SC calculates b = c ⊕H0(IDi ⊕H0(PWi) and A∗i =
H0((H0(b||IDi) ⊕ H0(b||PWi)) mod n0) and checks
if A∗i = Ai. If it is not true, the request for changing
password is rejected.
3) Smart card prompts Ui to enter a new password
PWnewi and calculates Ni
new = Ni ⊕ H0(b||PWi) ⊕
H0(b||PWnewi ) and Anewi = H0((H0(b||IDi) ⊕
H0(b||PWnewi )) mod n0). It replaces the values of
Ni, Ai and ai ⊕ Ai with Nnewi , Anewi and ai ⊕ Anewi ,
respectively. Thus the password is changed successfully.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our scheme with that of the
related schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] in terms of com-
munication cost, computational cost and security fetures. Like
in other works, we have not considered the cost of lightweight
operations like exclusive-or and concatenation operations. We
have taken the length of parameter n0 as 32 bits and the user
identity IDi, password PWi, random numbers, timestamps,
and output of hash function have taken as 128 bits long each;
while the lengths of y and g are taken as 1024 bits each,
similar to that in the scheme [16].
From Table II, it is evident that the scheme [14] has the
highest communication cost (3456 bits). The communication
cost of our scheme is same as that of the scheme [16]; however,
the scheme [16] does not provide the security features like
password exposure and user anonymity as shown in Table
IV. The scheme [22] has the least communication cost, i.e.
(1792 bits); however, it does not provide the security fea-
tures like password exposure, smart card loss attack, sound
repairability and user anonymity. Thus, our scheme has better




Islam [20] 1408 + 1408 = 2816
Jiang et al. [14] 2304 + 1152 = 3456
Bym [21] 2176 + 1152 = 3328
Truong [22] 640 + 1152 = 1792
Wang-Wang [16] 1536 + 1152 = 2688
Ours 1536 + 1152 = 2688
Table III presents the computational cost of our scheme
along with the related schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] in
login and authentication phases. The computational cost of
the schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] and our scheme are,
respectively, 5te+6th, 6te+8th, 10te+2ts+8th, 4tc+14th,
6te + 16th and 6te + 17th. The scheme [21] has the higher
computaional cost as compared to that of ours and does not
offer the security features like verifier table, password friendly
and timely typo detection. The scheme [20] has the least
computation cost; but it suffers from smart card loss attack.
TABLE III
COMPUTATION COST
Scheme User Server Sum
Islam [20] 3te + 3th 2te + 3th 5te + 6th
Jiang et al. [14] 4te + 4th 2te + 4th 6te + 8th
Bym [21] 5te + ts + 5th 5te + ts + 3th 10te + 2ts + 8th
Truong [22] tc + 7th 3tc + 7th 4tc + 14th
Wang-Wang [16] 3te + 9th 3te + 7th 6te + 16th
Ours 3te + 10th 3te + 7th 6te + 17th
th: time complexity of hash operation; te: time complexity of exponentiation
operation; ts: time complexity of encryption/decryption of symmetric key
cryptography; tc: time complexity of Chebysev polynomial
TABLE IV
SECURITY FEATURES
Security features [20] [14] [21] [22] [16] Ours
Verifier-table Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Password exposure Yes No Yes No No Yes
Password friendly Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Smart card loss attack No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Known attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provision of key agreement Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Timely typo detection Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Clock synchronization Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sound repairability Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Forward secrecy Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
User anonymity Yes No Yes No No Yes
The scheme [16] only takes one hash function less than ours;
however, it does not provide the security features like password
exposure and user anonymity as shown in Table IV. Thus, our
scheme satisfies all the security features while others do not
as given in Table IV.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have cryptanalyzed the security of the
Wang-Wang’s scheme and found that it does not provide user
anonymity and suffers from the password exposure attack.
We have improved this scheme by overcoming its limitations.
Further, we have shown that our scheme is more secured than
the existing schemes.
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A. Password exposure attack
Since user Ui sends {IDi, H0(b||PWi)} to S in step (2) of
registration phase, a malicious privileged administrator A has
knowledge of these two parameters. Assume that A somehow
gets access to the Ui’s smart card [19], then he can find Ui’s
password PWi as follows:
1) Choose a password PW ∗i and compute H0(b||PW ∗i )
2) Check if H0(b||PW ∗i ) = H0(b||PWi). If it is true, then
A gets the correct password PWi of Ui and stops the
procedure. Otherwise, repeat the steps (1) and (2).
Hence, user Ui’s password is not safe from a malicious
privileged administrator in this scheme.
B. User anonymity
Since user Ui sends the message {IDi, H0(b||PWi)} to S
in step (2) of registration phase, his identity IDi is transmitted
in plaintext. Thus, his identity is not anonymous from a
malicious privileged administrator A.
IV. OUR SCHEME
In this section, we present our improved scheme by over-
coming the weaknesses of the scheme [16]. In the registration
phase of our scheme, we send the hash value of the user’s
identity IDi and random string b instead of sending IDi
directly in plaintext to provide user anonymity. To resist from
password exposure attack, we store the encrypted value of the
random string b using XOR operation in the memory of the
smart card in the registration phase. Our scheme consists of
the following four phases:
A. Registration phase
User Ui executes the below steps to register with server S:
1) Ui selects his identity IDi, password PWi, and a
random string b.
2) He sends {H0(b||IDi), H0(b||PWi)} to S through a
secure channel.
3) After obtaining the registration message from Ui at
time T , S selects a random number ai and calculates
Ai = H0((H0(b||IDi) ⊕ H0(b||PWi)) mod n0). S
verifies from its database whether Ui is a registered user.
If not, S stores the information {H0(b||IDi), Treg =
T, ai, Honey List = NULL} in its database; other-
wise, it replaces the value of Treg with T, ai with
newly selected ai, and Honey List with NULL in
its database corresponding to Ui. Then, S calculates
Ni = H0(b||PWi)⊕H0(x||H0(b||IDi)||Treg).
4) S stores the information {Ni, Ai, Ai ⊕ ai, q, g, y, n0,
H0(.), ...H3(.)} in a SC and sends it to Ui securely.
5) After obtaining the smart card, Ui computes c =
b ⊕ H0(IDi ⊕ PWi) mod n0 and stores c into it
and finally the SC contains the data {Ni, Ai, Ai ⊕
ai, q, g, y, n0, H0(.), ...H3(.), c}
B. Login phase
The following steps are executed in this phase:
1) User Ui inputs his identity ID∗i and password PW
∗
i
after inserting his SC into the card reader attached with
the system.
2) SC calculates b = c ⊕ H0(ID∗i ⊕ PW ∗i ) mod n0 and
A∗i = H0((H0(b|| ID∗i ) ⊕H0(b||PW ∗i )) mod n0) and
checks if A∗i = Ai. If it is not true, the session is
terminated.
3) SC selects a random number u and computes
C1 = g
u mod p, Y1 = yu mod p,
k = H0(x||H0(b||ID∗i )||Treg) = Ni ⊕ H0(b||PW ∗i ),
ai = (Ai ⊕ ai) ⊕ A∗i , CIDi = H0(b||ID∗i ) ⊕
H0(C1||Y1), CAKi = (ai||k)⊕H0(C1||Y1), and Mi =
H0(Y1||k||CIDi||CAKi).
4) Ui sends the message {C1, CIDi, CAKi,Mi} to S via
a public channel.
C. Verification phase
On obtaining the login request {C1, CIDi, CAKi,Mi}
from Ui, S executes the following steps:
1) S calculates Y1 = (C1)x mod p and H0(b||IDi) =
CIDi ⊕H0(C1||Y1). It checks the entry of H0(b||IDi)
in its database. If it is not found, the session is rejected.
2) S calculates k = H0(x||H0(b||IDi)||Treg) and M∗i =
H0(Y1||k||CIDi||CAKi), where Treg is excerpted from
its database corresponding to the entry H0(b||IDi). It
checks if M∗i = Mi. If it is false, the session is
terminated.
3) S computes a‘i||k‘ = CAKi ⊕H0(C1||Y1) and verifies
if a‘i is equal to the stored ai. In case of inequality, S
denies the request; otherwise, it check if k‘ = k. If it
is true, then perform next step; otherwise, if a‘i = ai
and k‘i = ki, then S concludes that the card of Ui is
corrupted with a probability 1 − 12n0 . In that case, S
either enters k‘ into Honey List if |Honey List| < m0
(e.g. m0 = 10) or suspends the smart card of Ui until
he re-registers (i.e. when |Honey List| = m0).
4) S creates a random number v and calculates the tempo-
rary key KS = (C1)v mod p,C2 = gv mod p and
C3 = H1(H0(b||IDi)||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KS). S sends
the message {C2, C3} to Ui via an insecure channel.
5) After obtaining the message {C2, C3} from S, the
SC calculates KU = (C2)u mod p,C∗3 =
H1(H0(b||IDi)||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ), and checks if
C∗3 = C3. If it is true, Ui authenticates S and calculates
C4 = H2(H0(b||IDi) ||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ). Ui sends
the message {C4} to S via a public channel.
6) After obtaining the message {C4} from Ui, S calcu-
lates C4∗ = H2(H0(b|| IDi)||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KS),
and checks if C∗4 = C4. If it is true, S authenticates
Ui and accepts his login request; otherwise, the session
is terminated.
7) Ui and S share the session key skU = H3(H0(b||IDi)||
IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ) = H3(H0(b||IDi)||IDS ||Y1||C2
||k||KS) = skS for secured future communication.
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D. Password change phase
User Ui performs the following steps to change his pass-
word:
1) Ui inputs his IDi and PWi after inserting his SC into
the card reader attached with the system.
2) SC calculates b = c ⊕H0(IDi ⊕H0(PWi) and A∗i =
H0((H0(b||IDi) ⊕ H0(b||PWi)) mod n0) and checks
if A∗i = Ai. If it is not true, the request for changing
password is rejected.
3) Smart card prompts Ui to enter a new password
PWnewi and calculates Ni
new = Ni ⊕ H0(b||PWi) ⊕
H0(b||PWnewi ) and Anewi = H0((H0(b||IDi) ⊕
H0(b||PWnewi )) mod n0). It replaces the values of
Ni, Ai and ai ⊕ Ai with Nnewi , Anewi and ai ⊕ Anewi ,
respectively. Thus the password is changed successfully.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our scheme with that of the
related schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] in terms of com-
munication cost, computational cost and security fetures. Like
in other works, we have not considered the cost of lightweight
operations like exclusive-or and concatenation operations. We
have taken the length of parameter n0 as 32 bits and the user
identity IDi, password PWi, random numbers, timestamps,
and output of hash function have taken as 128 bits long each;
while the lengths of y and g are taken as 1024 bits each,
similar to that in the scheme [16].
From Table II, it is evident that the scheme [14] has the
highest communication cost (3456 bits). The communication
cost of our scheme is same as that of the scheme [16]; however,
the scheme [16] does not provide the security features like
password exposure and user anonymity as shown in Table
IV. The scheme [22] has the least communication cost, i.e.
(1792 bits); however, it does not provide the security fea-
tures like password exposure, smart card loss attack, sound
repairability and user anonymity. Thus, our scheme has better




Islam [20] 1408 + 1408 = 2816
Jiang et al. [14] 2304 + 1152 = 3456
Bym [21] 2176 + 1152 = 3328
Truong [22] 640 + 1152 = 1792
Wang-Wang [16] 1536 + 1152 = 2688
Ours 1536 + 1152 = 2688
Table III presents the computational cost of our scheme
along with the related schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] in
login and authentication phases. The computational cost of
the schemes [20], [14], [21], [22], [16] and our scheme are,
respectively, 5te+6th, 6te+8th, 10te+2ts+8th, 4tc+14th,
6te + 16th and 6te + 17th. The scheme [21] has the higher
computaional cost as compared to that of ours and does not
offer the security features like verifier table, password friendly
and timely typo detection. The scheme [20] has the least
computation cost; but it suffers from smart card loss attack.
TABLE III
COMPUTATION COST
Scheme User Server Sum
Islam [20] 3te + 3th 2te + 3th 5te + 6th
Jiang et al. [14] 4te + 4th 2te + 4th 6te + 8th
Bym [21] 5te + ts + 5th 5te + ts + 3th 10te + 2ts + 8th
Truong [22] tc + 7th 3tc + 7th 4tc + 14th
Wang-Wang [16] 3te + 9th 3te + 7th 6te + 16th
Ours 3te + 10th 3te + 7th 6te + 17th
th: time complexity of hash operation; te: time complexity of exponentiation
operation; ts: time complexity of encryption/decryption of symmetric key
cryptography; tc: time complexity of Chebysev polynomial
TABLE IV
SECURITY FEATURES
Security features [20] [14] [21] [22] [16] Ours
Verifier-table Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Password exposure Yes No Yes No No Yes
Password friendly Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Smart card loss attack No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Known attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provision of key agreement Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Timely typo detection Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Clock synchronization Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sound repairability Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Forward secrecy Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
User anonymity Yes No Yes No No Yes
The scheme [16] only takes one hash function less than ours;
however, it does not provide the security features like password
exposure and user anonymity as shown in Table IV. Thus, our
scheme satisfies all the security features while others do not
as given in Table IV.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have cryptanalyzed the security of the
Wang-Wang’s scheme and found that it does not provide user
anonymity and suffers from the password exposure attack.
We have improved this scheme by overcoming its limitations.
Further, we have shown that our scheme is more secured than
the existing schemes.
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A. Password exposure attack
Since user Ui sends {IDi, H0(b||PWi)} to S in step (2) of
registration phase, a malicious privileged administrator A has
knowledge of these two parameters. Assume that A somehow
gets access to the Ui’s smart card [19], then he can find Ui’s
password PWi as follows:
1) Choose a password PW ∗i and compute H0(b||PW ∗i )
2) Check if H0(b||PW ∗i ) = H0(b||PWi). If it is true, then
A gets the correct password PWi of Ui and stops the
procedure. Otherwise, repeat the steps (1) and (2).
Hence, user Ui’s password is not safe from a malicious
privileged administrator in this scheme.
B. User anonymity
Since user Ui sends the message {IDi, H0(b||PWi)} to S
in step (2) of registration phase, his identity IDi is transmitted
in plaintext. Thus, his identity is not anonymous from a
malicious privileged administrator A.
IV. OUR SCHEME
In this section, we present our improved scheme by over-
coming the weaknesses of the scheme [16]. In the registration
phase of our scheme, we send the hash value of the user’s
identity IDi and random string b instead of sending IDi
directly in plaintext to provide user anonymity. To resist from
password exposure attack, we store the encrypted value of the
random string b using XOR operation in the memory of the
smart card in the registration phase. Our scheme consists of
the following four phases:
A. Registration phase
User Ui executes the below steps to register with server S:
1) Ui selects his identity IDi, password PWi, and a
random string b.
2) He sends {H0(b||IDi), H0(b||PWi)} to S through a
secure channel.
3) After obtaining the registration message from Ui at
time T , S selects a random number ai and calculates
Ai = H0((H0(b||IDi) ⊕ H0(b||PWi)) mod n0). S
verifies from its database whether Ui is a registered user.
If not, S stores the information {H0(b||IDi), Treg =
T, ai, Honey List = NULL} in its database; other-
wise, it replaces the value of Treg with T, ai with
newly selected ai, and Honey List with NULL in
its database corresponding to Ui. Then, S calculates
Ni = H0(b||PWi)⊕H0(x||H0(b||IDi)||Treg).
4) S stores the information {Ni, Ai, Ai ⊕ ai, q, g, y, n0,
H0(.), ...H3(.)} in a SC and sends it to Ui securely.
5) After obtaining the smart card, Ui computes c =
b ⊕ H0(IDi ⊕ PWi) mod n0 and stores c into it
and finally the SC contains the data {Ni, Ai, Ai ⊕
ai, q, g, y, n0, H0(.), ...H3(.), c}
B. Login phase
The following steps are executed in this phase:
1) User Ui inputs his identity ID∗i and password PW
∗
i
after inserting his SC into the card reader attached with
the system.
2) SC calculates b = c ⊕ H0(ID∗i ⊕ PW ∗i ) mod n0 and
A∗i = H0((H0(b|| ID∗i ) ⊕H0(b||PW ∗i )) mod n0) and
checks if A∗i = Ai. If it is not true, the session is
terminated.
3) SC selects a random number u and computes
C1 = g
u mod p, Y1 = yu mod p,
k = H0(x||H0(b||ID∗i )||Treg) = Ni ⊕ H0(b||PW ∗i ),
ai = (Ai ⊕ ai) ⊕ A∗i , CIDi = H0(b||ID∗i ) ⊕
H0(C1||Y1), CAKi = (ai||k)⊕H0(C1||Y1), and Mi =
H0(Y1||k||CIDi||CAKi).
4) Ui sends the message {C1, CIDi, CAKi,Mi} to S via
a public channel.
C. Verification phase
On obtaining the login request {C1, CIDi, CAKi,Mi}
from Ui, S executes the following steps:
1) S calculates Y1 = (C1)x mod p and H0(b||IDi) =
CIDi ⊕H0(C1||Y1). It checks the entry of H0(b||IDi)
in its database. If it is not found, the session is rejected.
2) S calculates k = H0(x||H0(b||IDi)||Treg) and M∗i =
H0(Y1||k||CIDi||CAKi), where Treg is excerpted from
its database corresponding to the entry H0(b||IDi). It
checks if M∗i = Mi. If it is false, the session is
terminated.
3) S computes a‘i||k‘ = CAKi ⊕H0(C1||Y1) and verifies
if a‘i is equal to the stored ai. In case of inequality, S
denies the request; otherwise, it check if k‘ = k. If it
is true, then perform next step; otherwise, if a‘i = ai
and k‘i = ki, then S concludes that the card of Ui is
corrupted with a probability 1 − 12n0 . In that case, S
either enters k‘ into Honey List if |Honey List| < m0
(e.g. m0 = 10) or suspends the smart card of Ui until
he re-registers (i.e. when |Honey List| = m0).
4) S creates a random number v and calculates the tempo-
rary key KS = (C1)v mod p,C2 = gv mod p and
C3 = H1(H0(b||IDi)||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KS). S sends
the message {C2, C3} to Ui via an insecure channel.
5) After obtaining the message {C2, C3} from S, the
SC calculates KU = (C2)u mod p,C∗3 =
H1(H0(b||IDi)||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ), and checks if
C∗3 = C3. If it is true, Ui authenticates S and calculates
C4 = H2(H0(b||IDi) ||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ). Ui sends
the message {C4} to S via a public channel.
6) After obtaining the message {C4} from Ui, S calcu-
lates C4∗ = H2(H0(b|| IDi)||IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KS),
and checks if C∗4 = C4. If it is true, S authenticates
Ui and accepts his login request; otherwise, the session
is terminated.
7) Ui and S share the session key skU = H3(H0(b||IDi)||
IDS ||Y1||C2||k||KU ) = H3(H0(b||IDi)||IDS ||Y1||C2
||k||KS) = skS for secured future communication.
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